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Abstract—In the push-pull-clone collaborative editing model
widely used in distributed version control systems users replicate
shared data, modify it and redistribute modified versions of this
data without the need of a central authority. However, in this
model no usage restriction mechanism is proposed to control what
users can do with the data after it has been released to them. In
this paper we extended the push-pull-clone model with contracts
that express usage restrictions and that are checked a posteriori
by users when they receive the modified data. We propose a
merging algorithm that deals not only with modifications on data
but also with contracts. A log-auditing protocol is used to detect
users who do not respect contracts and to adjust user trust levels.
Our proposed contract-based model has been implemented and
evaluated by using PeerSim simulator.
Index Terms—collaborative editing, contract-based model,
push-pull-clone model, peer-to-peer computing, trust, log audit-
ing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most platforms hosting social services such as Facebook
or Google+ rely on a central authority and place personal
information in the hands of a single large corporation which
is a perceived privacy threat. Users must provide and store
their data to vendors of these services and have to trust that
they will preserve privacy of their data, but they have little
control over the usage of their data after sharing it with other
users. Several solutions were proposed to replace the central
authority-based collaboration with a distributed collaboration
that offers support for decentralization of services such as
peer-to-peer file sharing (e.g eDonkey and BitTorrent), peer-
to-peer applications for audio and video calls (e.g. Skype)
and peer-to-peer social networks (e.g. Diaspora and Peerson).
In the domain of collaborative editing of shared documents
Distributed Version Control Systems (DVCS) such as Git
[10] and Mercurial [15] are well-known examples of social
software that demonstrate that it is possible to share data
without the need for a collaboration provider. In DVCS
systems users replicate shared data, modify it and redistribute
modified versions of this data by using the primitives push,
pull and clone. Users clone shared data and maintain in a
local workspace this data and modifications done on this data.
Users can then push their changes to different channels and
other users that have granted rights may pull these changes
from these channels. Throughout this paper we will refer to
this model of collaboration as push-pull-clone model (PPC).
In the PPC collaboration model it is very difficult to control
what users will do with the data after it has been released to
them and that they will not misbehave and violate usage policy.
Usage control mechanisms model obligation, permission and
forbiddance as contracts [16] that users receive together with
data which refer to what happens to data after it has been
released to authorized people, for example, how they may,
should and should not use it. The main issue addressed by
this paper is how usage restriction can be expressed and
checked within PPC model and what response actions can be
taken in order to discourage/penalize behavior of users that
misbehaved.
At the beginning DVCS systems were mainly used by devel-
opers in open-source code projects but nowadays they started
to be widely adopted by companies for code development. In
open source projects, the usage restriction is expressed in the
license of the code, while in closed source code projects, it is
expressed in the contracts developers sign when accepting their
job. In both cases, usage restrictions are checked a posteriori
outside the collaborative environment with social control or
plagiarism detection. As a result of observations concerning
usage violation trust on the users that misbehaved is implicitly
decremented and collaboration with those users risks to be
stopped. We aim at proposing a contract model that expresses
usage restrictions as policies that can be checked within the
collaborative environment.
Access control mechanisms do not address the issue of
usage restriction after data was released to users. Traditional
access control mechanisms prevent users from accessing to
data and granted rights are checked before access is allowed.
It has been shown that these access control mechanisms are
too strict [4]. There exist some optimistic access control
approaches [20] that check a-posteriori access policies. In
these approaches, if user actions violate granted rights, a
recovery mechanism is applied and all carried-out operations
are removed. Usually, this recovery mechanism requires a
centralized authority that ensures that the recovery is taken
by the whole system. However, the recovery mechanism is
difficult to be applied in decentralized systems such as DVCS
where a user does not have knowledge of the global network
of collaboration. Generally, access control mechanisms aim at
ensuring that systems are used correctly by authorized users
with authorized actions. Rather than ensuring a strong system
security, we aim at offering a flexible approach based on
contracts that can be checked after users gained access to
data and on trust management mechanisms that help users
collaborate with other users they trust. However, contract-
based models such as Hippocratic databases [1] and P3P [6]
have not been deployed for the push-pull-clone collaboration.
The main issue in designing a contract-based distributed
collaboration is that contracts are objects that are part of the
replication mechanism. In our contract-based model each user
maintains a local workspace that contains local data as well as
modifications done on the shared data and contracts related to
the usage of the shared data. The logged changes and contracts
are shared with other users. The merging algorithm has to
deal not only with merging modifications on data but also
with contracts. Moreover, conflicts have to be resolved not
only between modifications, but also between contracts. For
checking if users respect usage restriction, each user performs
a log-auditing mechanism. According to auditing results users
adjust their trust levels. To our knowledge there is no existing
collaborative editing model based on contracts which allows
to audit and update trust levels during editing process. Major
contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A model of distributed collaborative editing based on
contracts in weakly consistent replication that we call
throughout this paper the C-PPC (contract extended push-
pull-clone) model. The proposed model ensures CCI
consistency [21] on the shared document.
• A set of experiments for evaluation of the performance
of the C-PPC model and of the log auditing mechanism
for detection of users misbehavior and for updating trust
levels by using a peer-to-peer simulator.
The paper is structured as follows. We start by presenting an
overview of our proposed approach. We then describe editing
model and collaborative process which ensure properties of
model and of contract specification. We next discuss the
consistency of the model. We then briefly describe our solution
to assess trust. We also provide some experimental results of
the simulation to evaluate the efficiency of our model. We
compare our work with some related approaches. We end our
paper with some concluding remarks and directions for future
work.
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
In this section we present an overview of our C-PPC model.
Collaborative editing requires high levels of respect and trust
among users. To create a trustful and respectful collaborative
environment, we consider creating a collaboration contract that
will be used in all collaborative interactions.
Let us give a simple example for illustrating how C-PPC
model works. Let us consider a network composed of four
users A, B, C, and D who trust each other. Users share and
edit collaboratively a document. At the beginning the network
is built based on social trust between users and connections
are established only between users who trust each other.
Users trust their collaborators with different trust levels that
are updated according to their collaboration experience. For
instance, A trusts both B and C, however, A has different trust
levels for B and C and thus gives them different contracts
over the shared document. For example, A gives B the
permission to edit, while he/she gives C only the permission
to view the document. Also, A gives C an obligation to send
feedback while this obligation is not given to B. Receivers are
expected to follow these contracts. Otherwise, their trust levels
will be adjusted once misbehavior is detected. We log user
modifications on the shared documents as well as contracts
users give to other users when they share their modifications.
Our editing model uses push, pull and clone as native direct
pair-wise communications between users. To work with others
a user simply sets up a local workspace for his own work, and
uses trusted channels to push his documents to trusted friends.
Other users can then get the document by cloning (executing
a clone primitive) the document from the user’s workspace.
In this way they have independent local workspaces for the
shared document, do their changes locally and publish them
by executing a push primitive. The user then executes a pull
primitive to get the changes into his local workspace. Push,
pull, and clone primitives are used for efficient distributed
collaboration and they were already implemented in distributed
version control systems such as Git and Mercurial. We assume
the system uses a pairwise FIFO channel between two users for
changes propagation to guarantee that messages are received in
the order they were sent. This order can be preserved by using
logical timestamps to sort messages into chronological order.
Push, pull and clone communication primitives are operated
on such ordered channel.
In Fig. 1, we present a scenario of our C-PPC model.
Without trust management, users might share and reconcile
replicas with all group members without taking into account
if they well-behave or misbehave. In our C-PPC model users
are not uniformly trusted and a user generally collaborates only
with trusted users. Our model is adaptable to the case when a
user changes his behavior from good to bad as his trust or rep-
utation is reduced and other users will cease communication
with that user. Users trust levels are adjusted mainly based
on their past behavior. A misbehavior detection mechanism
and trust model to manage trust levels of collaborators are
mandatory to maintain correctly such network. In the Fig.1,
the upper half shows the trust levels between users A, B, C and
D; and the bottom half shows a collaboration scenario using
our C-PPC model where users work on the shared document
Doc. User D wants to share his changes with user B with the
contract forbiddance to delete and permission to share and
therefore he pushes his changes together with this contract to
the channel of the communication with user B. As it is the
first time that user B initiates a communication with user D
he has to clone the repository with changes from user D. In
parallel, user D collaborates with user C. We suppose that
afterward, user C continues to collaborate with user B. As
a result of log auditing of certain communications, user B
discovers that C did not respect the contracts he received,
then user B decrements the trust level of user C and cuts
further collaboration with user C since his trust level becomes
low. Further, user B does some changes that he pushes to
user A with contract forbiddance to delete and permission
to share. We can see from the figure that at the end user
B stopped collaboration with users C that misbehaved and
continues collaboration with user A that well behaved.
Fig. 1. Contract-extended PPC model. Users have different trust
levels on others. They discard all communications from/to distrustful
users.
III. EDITING MODEL
In this section we describe our editing model composed of
users, logs of operations on shared document and contracts
between users.
A. Users
Users are main participants in our C-PPC model. Users are
connected in a collaborative network based on the trust they
have in other users. However users are not uniformly trusted
by others. Each user keeps at his local site the replica of
shared documents and works locally on these replicas. For
sake of simplicity we consider that all users (also called sites
throughout this paper) are collaborating on a single shared
document.
B. Document, Changes and Logs
The system keeps a document as a log of operations that
have been done during the collaborative editing process. The
log maintains information about user contributions to different
parts of the document and when these contributions were
performed. The outcome of collaborative editing is a document
that could be obtained by replaying the write operations such
as insert, delete, update from the log. Two users can make
progress independently on the shared document. Changes are
propagated in weakly consistent manner, i.e. a user can decide
when, with whom and what data is sent and synchronized.
Push, pull and clone communication primitives are operated
on FIFO channels for allowing an ordered exchange of oper-
ations done on document replicas. A replica log contains all
operations that have been generated locally or received from
other users. Logs are created and updated at user sites. The
log structure is defined as:
Definition 1. Let P be a set of operations {insert, delete,
update, share} that users can generate; and let T be a set
of event types {write, share, contract}. An event e is defined
as a triplet of 〈evt ∈ T, op ∈ P, attr〉, in which evt is the event
type, op is an operation and attr includes attribute pairs of
{attr name, attr value} to present extended information for
each event.
Definition 2. A document log L is defined as an append-only
ordered list of events in the form [e1, e2, . . . , en].
In Listing 1 we give an example of a log containing a single
event that has three attributes.
<log> <!-- at site D -->
<event>
<evt>write</evt>
<op>insert</op>
<attr>
<by>User D</by>
<content>first lines of document</content>
<gsn>1</gsn>
</attr>
</event>
</log>
Listing 1. An example of log with one event in XML format
Users store operations in their logs in an order that is
consistent with the generated order. The share operation is
issued and logged when a user pushes his changes. A share
operation can be followed in the log by contract operations
representing usage policies for the shared data.
C. Contracts
In our model, a contract expresses usage policy which one
user expects others to respect when they receive and use shared
data. Contracts are built on the top of a basic deontic logic
[5] with the normative concepts of obligation, permission and
forbiddance representing what one ought to, may, or must not
do. We use the same notion of contract as in [16].
<log> <!-- at site B -->
<event>
<evt>write</evt><op>insert</op>
<attr>
<by>User D</by>
<content>first lines of document</content>
<gsn>1</gsn>
</attr>
</event>
<event>
<evt>share</evt><op>share</op>
<attr>
<by>User D</by><to>User B</to>
<gsn>2</gsn>
<rsn>1</rsn>
</attr>
</event>
<event>
<evt>contract</evt><op>delete</op>
<attr>
<by>User D</by><to>User B</to>
<modal>F</modal>
<gsn>3</gsn>
<rsn>2</rsn>
</attr>
</event>
<event>
<evt>contract</evt><op>share</op>
<attr>
<by>User D</by><to>User B</to>
<modal>P</modal>
<gsn>4</gsn>
<rsn>3</rsn>
</attr>
</event>
</log>
Listing 2. An example of log containing contract events
1) Contract definition: A contract is denoted by a modality
followed by an action. Unlike access control policy-based
model [24] where an enforcing policy is integrated in the
replication protocol, there is no entity in our system that
enforces users to follow contracts. Instead, each user performs
a self-auditing on collaboration logs to analyze whether users
respected the given contracts. Once any misbehavior not
conforming to given contracts is detected, the trust level of
the user who misbehaved will be decremented.
A contract which is a statement of data usage willingness
one user gives to intended receiving user is defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let a contract primitive be a log-event that has
a modality attribute (called modal) equal with P (permission),
O (obligation), F (forbiddance) or M (omission). If op is
an operation then the contract primitive cop based on op is
denoted as: Fop, Oop, Pop, Mop. A contract C is defined as a
set of one or several contract primitives.
For example, in Fig. 1, user D gives to user B a con-
tract C Fdelete, Pshare (forbiddance to delete and permission
to share). The two contract primitives are Fdelete and Pshare.
When a user shares data by means of a push primitive, a
contract is logged as events with attributes representing users
who sent and received the contract. In Listing 2 we illustrate
the representation of the log at site B after user B cloned
document Doc from user D.
The event attribute GSN (generate sequence number) of
an event is equal to the logical clock [9] at the site where
the event was generated. The event attribute RSN (receive
sequence number) of a share or contract event is equal to
the logical clock of the receiving site at the reception of this
event. We will discuss how to manage these sequence numbers
in the next section.
If cop is a contract primitive then c¬op, ¬ cop, ¬ c¬op
are contract primitives too. For instance, c Oop denotes an
obligation to perform op and c Pop denotes a permission
to perform op. If we have n contract primitives, we can
obtain a contract by merging these contract primitives. For
instance, if we have two contract primitives C Pop1 (permission
of performing op1) and C Oop2 (obligation of performing
op2), then we can build the contract C Pop1 , Oop2 . Concerning
merging contract primitives to obtain a contract, we define the
following axioms:
(A1) C c¬op → ¬ C cop
(A2) C c1 ∧ (c1 → c2) → C c2.
(A3) Cc1op>...>cnop → Cc1op .
The axiom (A1) means that if C says c¬op then it is
deducible C does not say cop. The axiom (A2) shows the
consequent deducibility. For instance, if we suppose that
Oupdate → Pinsert, then C Oupdate ∧ (Oupdate → Pinsert) →
C Pinsert . The axiom (A3) rules the merging process. It means
that if we have n contract primitives c1op > . . . > c
n
op then these
contract primitives can be merged and the resulting contract is
deducible as Cc1op . For instance, if C Oop, P¬op and Oop > P¬op
then it is deducible to have a contract C Oop . This means that
even if ¬op is permitted to be performed with the contract
C P
¬op
, there is an obligation to perform op if C P
¬op
and
C Oop are merged as Oop > P¬op.
2) Contract conflicts: Although each contract is conflict
free, conflicts may arise when contracts are merged. There
are two cases of conflict that are weak conflict, for instance,
a conflict between permission and forbiddance or between
obligation and omission; and strong conflict when a contract
refers to do and not to do the same action, for instance, a
conflict between obligation and forbiddance.
Definition 4. Two contracts C1 and C2 conflict (denoted as
C1 ✠C2) if one primitive contract ci ∈ C1 conflicts with
another primitive contract cj ∈ C2. Primitive contracts are
conflicting in the following cases: Oop ✠O¬op, Pop ✠Fop,
and Oop ✠Mop.
We discuss in what follows how conflicts are resolved.
Contracts are interrelated and interdependent and there is no
hierarchy between them. Thus, some priorities can be estab-
lished in terms of specific objectives and they vary depending
on the system. One way to select a contract in the case of a
conflict is to assign orders to various contracts, and select the
one with the highest or lowest order. We describe afterward a
method for ordering contracts based on the order of operations
associated with them.
Definition 5. The order of a contract primitive is a value
assigned to it that determines the priority of the contract
primitive with respect to another contract primitive.
Depending on the operations, the order of contract prim-
itives are given as follows. Operations are categorized to
different groups. Given two operations op1 and op2 with
the order op1 > op2, then the order of contract primitives is
assigned according to the order of operations, cop1 > cop2 .
If the contract primitives associated with operations belong
to different groups, then we determine a combined order for
each, based on the order within group and the order of the
group. We discuss below the comparison of two contracts.
Let P be a set of n operations that could be ordered as
[op1, op2, . . ., opn] from highest to lowest priority, S be a
set of n-digit ternary numbers from 0 to 3n and a contract
C including contract primitives built over operations of P. A
mapping from C to S has as result s ∈ S where: (1) if Oopi
∨ Fopi ∈ C, s[i] = 0; (2) if Mopi ∨ Popi ∈ C, s[i] = 2; (3) if
neither (1) nor (2) are true, s[i] = 1. The comparison of two
contracts C1 and C2 is based on the comparison of s1 and s2
and (C1 > C2) ⇔ (s1 > s2). For instance, given a set P of
two operations (n=2) in the order [op1, op2], we suppose that
we want to compare two contracts C1 = [Oop1 , Pop2 ] and C2
= [Oop2 ]. The 2-digit ternary numbers s1 = 02 and s2 = 10
are mapped from C1, C2 to S. We have s2 > s1, so [Oop2 ] >
[Oop1 , Pop2 ], hence we have C2 > C1.
3) Contract dominance: A primitive contract c2 is said to
dominate one another c1 if c2 is of higher order than c1 or
c2 overrides c1 where c2 overrides c1 means (c1.op = c2.op)
∧ (c1.attr.by = c2.attr.by) ∧ (c1.attr.to =
c2.attr.to) ∧ (c2 was received after c1).
IV. COLLABORATIVE PROCESS
In this section, we present different aspects of a collabo-
rative process involving our C-PPC model: logging changes,
pushing logs containing document modifications and contracts,
and merging pairwise logs.
A. Logging changes
Each site maintains a local clock to count events (write,
share, and contract) received from remote sites. As the
changes are made or received, they are added to log in the
following manner:
• When a site generates a new event e, it adds e to
the end of local log in the order of occurrence and
augments its clock. The clock value will be assigned to
the attribute GSN (generate sequence number) of event
e, i.e. e.attr.GSN = clock.
• When a site receives a log from another site, the events
from the remote log that are new to the local log are
appended at the end of the local log in the same order as
in the remote log.
• When a user shares a document with another user, he
sends a share event followed by some contracts so-called
e which are logged by the receiving user. We denote by
e one of these events (share or contract). At the time of
reception, the receiver assigns its clock to the attribute
RSN receive sequence number of e, i.e. e.attr.RSN
= clock.
We assume that a user is unwilling to disclose to all col-
laborating users all the sharing events and contracts that
he gave to a certain user. Thus share events and contracts
are not kept in the log of the sender. Moreover, even if a
site sends those events to other sites, the receiving sites
could refuse integration of remote changes. In this way
sending sites would contain share and contract events that
have not been accepted by receivers. Therefore, share
events and contracts are not logged by the sending site.
B. Pushing logs containing contracts
Contracts are given when a user shares a document to
another user. The user pushes his log as follows:
• Since a document is shared as a log of operations,
therefore to send a contract for document usage control,
the contract is attached at the end of the log.
• In sharing, a user specifies a new contract; however, he
cannot specify a higher contract than what he currently
holds. For instance, if a user u currently holds a contract
C on the document d, he only can share d with another
user with a contract C′ that C′ ≤ C.
• A user cannot specify a new contract which conflicts
with his current contract. For instance, if a user u has
a contract C Oop , then he cannot add O¬op or Mop to C.
• The contracts a user specifies to two distinguished users
might be different. These two users do not not know the
contract of the other user as far as they do not collaborate
with each other.
During the collaborative process the log of each site grows
and the document and contracts are updated each time a user
synchronizes with other users.
C. Merging pairwise logs
The collaboration involves logs reconciliation. When a user
u receives a remote log L′ from a remote user v through anti-
entropy propagation, u elects new events from L′ to append
to his log L.
function merging_check(u,v,L,L’,CT,CT’):
IF Trust(u,v) is low
# v is distrustful
result = NoMerge-NoBranch
ELSE:
IF conflict(ct’ in CT’, ct in CT)
result = Branch-Reject
ELSE:
result = Merge
ENDIF
return result
ENDIF
Listing 3. Pseudo-code for merging check
A site might receive a remote log with conflicting contracts.
In the case of conflicts, the user decides either to reject the
remote document version or to create a new branch for the
remote version or to leave the local version to accept new one.
The function to check for conflict before merging is presented
in Listing 3. A site neither merges nor creates a new branch
if the sender is distrustful. We have the condition to create a
new branch if the remote log includes any primitive contract
which conflicts with current contract. We consider dominance
of contract if a user revokes an old contract and replaces it by
a new one. For instance, the old contract Fshare received by
site v from site u can be replaced by a new one Pshare. Two
logs can be merged if no conflict is found.
If the result returned by merging_check function is
Merge, i.e. the merge can be performed, we use anti-entropy
updating and perform synchronization by using our proposed
merging mechanism. We assume the merging mechanism
ensures causality not only between write operations, but also
between share operations and contracts. We next discuss in
detail how to ensure causality.
An event e is said committed by site u if it is firstly
appended to the log of site u after its generation. To determine
the total order of events committed by one site, we use the
“commit sequence number” CSN. In merge function presented
in Listing 4, commit sequence number CSN is used to track
the last event committed by one site.
As we mentioned before, the attributes of event e,
e.attr.GSN and e.attr.RSN, record the values of the
clock of its generation and its receipt, respectively. Note that
though GSN is assigned to events before a log is propagated,
RSN is assigned to share event and contract at the receiving
site during the synchronization.
The value of CSN of an event e committed by site u is
computed as follows:
• If e is a write operation generated by u, the commit
sequence number CSN is equal to the value of attribute
e.atrr.GSN. The site who commited e is extracted
from e’s attribute e.attr.by.
• If e is a share operation or a contract primitive given
by site v to site u and accepted by site u, the commit
sequence number CSN is equal to the value of attribute
e.attr.RSN. The site who commits e is extracted from
attribute e.attr.to.
The data structure of log and the merging mechanism
ensuring that new events are added only to the end of log
enable a property that if the log of a site u contains an event
e committed by v with a commit sequence number CSN,
then it has contained all the events committed by v prior
to CSN. In order to avoid merging events that have been
already integrated, we use a local-vector LV whose maximum
size is the number of all collaborators to keep the highest
commit sequence number CSN of each site v 6= u known by
u (highest number CSN is kept in LVu[v]). This allows a site
u to correctly determine that an event from site v should be
merged into local log if its CSN is higher than the current
entry value of LV corresponding to its belonging site.
It is possible to replay write operations from the log to get
the document state. We can use any existing approaches of
communicative replicated data type (CRDT) such as Logoot
[23] in which concurrent operations can be replayed in any
causal order as they are designed to commute.
The complexity of merging mechanism illustrated in Listing
4 is O(n) where n is the size of the remote log L′.
function merge(L, L’, clock):
FOR i = 1 to sizeOf(L’)
e := L’[i]
IF e.evt == ‘‘write’’:
CSN := e.attr.GSN
site := e.attr.by
ELSE:
IF e.attr.RSN == null
e.attr.RSN = clock
clock := clock +1
ENDIF
site = e.attr.to
CSN = e.attr.RSN
ENDIF
IF CSN > LV[site]
append e to the end of L
LV[site] = CSN
ENDIF
ENDFOR
Listing 4. Pseudo-code for merging local log L with remote log L’
V. CONSISTENCY OF C-PPC MODEL
A main issue in maintaining consistency of our C-PPC
model is that changes of one site are not broastcasted to
all other sites since users’ trust levels are different and sites
might receive different contracts for the same document state.
We discuss the consistency of proposed model based on
the well known CCI consistency model [21] which requires
the convergence of document, the causality and intention
preservation.
Concerning causality preservation, our model deals with two
causal relationships: happened-before relation and semantic
causality relation.
(a) happened-before relationship
between write operations generated
at one site (b) happened-before relationships
between events (write operations
opj and contracts ctk) of two sites
Fig. 2. Causal relations
1) Happened-before relation “→”: Any two events e1 and
e2 are in a happened-before relation [9] e1 → e2 if:
(i) for two write operations generated at the same site e1
and e2, if e1 was generated before e2 then e1 → e2. In detail
we have (e1 → e2) ⇔ (e1.attr.by = e2.attr.by)
and (e1.attr.GSN < e2.attr.GSN) and (e1.evt =
e2.evt = write) (example in Fig.2.(a))
(ii) for any two events generated by different sites, e1
generated by site u and e2 generated by site v, e1 → e2 if
e2 is committed after the arrival of e1 at site v (example in
Fig.2(b))
In our model logs are propagated by using anti-entropy [3]
which ensures the causality without using state vectors [12]
or causal barriers [17].
2) Semantic causal relation: Two contracts e1 and e2 are
said to be in a semantic causal relation if e1 is committed by
site u before that e2 is given to another site. The contracts
one site gives to other sites should depend on his current
contracts: (e1.evt = e2.evt = ‘‘contract’’) and
(e1.attr.to = e2.attr.by) and (e1.attr.RSN <
e2.attr.GSN).
The causality in our C-PPC model is preserved if log is not
tampered. We use authenticators for patches of events to detect
any attacks to the log; however due to the space limitation,
in this paper we omit our solution about the construction
and verification of authenticators. Authenticators prevent re-
ordering of log events and therefore the causality is preserved.
If log was tampered, receiving site might discard it and the
trust level of the site that misbehaved is decremented.
Concerning convergence, as our C-PPC model uses CRDT
for commutative operations it ensures that in the presence of
different contracts received by different sites when the same
set of write operations was executed at those sites, their copies
of the shared document are identical. However the shared
document might be in different states on two sites since the
shared document is not equally distributed due to the use of
contracts and the trust levels of users. And finally concerning
the property of intention preservation of the proposed model,
it is ensured by causality preservation and CRDT approach
[23].
VI. TRUST ASSESSMENT BASED ON LOG-AUDITING
We consider a collaborating system where each user is
supposed to respect given contracts. If he does, then the user is
trustful; otherwise the user is distrustful or suspicious. There
are two ways in which a user cannot be trustful: he can either
do actions violating a contract or ignore an obligation that
needs to be fulfilled. Ideally, if a user misbehaves in either
of these ways, other users should detect his misbehavior.
A user is considered as distrustful if it violates a contract,
and a user is considered as suspicious if he does not prove
that he conforms to an obligation. For instance, a user that
receives the obligation “obligation to insert” but he never
fulfills this obligation is considered suspicious. Note that a
user u withdraws the suspicious indication on a user v if the
user v fulfilled the obligations. Malicious users may try to
hide their misbehavior by tampering the log. Briefly, a user u
is malicious if he re-orders, inserts or deletes events in the
log that consequently affect the auditing result. For instance,
u removes some obligations that he does not want to fulfill.
The log auditing mechanism should guarantee that no log is
tampered. The audit mechanism returns four types of auditing-
results: trustful, distrustful, suspicious and malicious.
A site can call the auditing protocol at any time. We denote
TrustLu (v) as the trust value that a user u assigns to a user
v. All users are set an initial default trust value, for example
their social trusts. A user u updates TrustLu (v) for a user v
mainly based on the log-auditing result. In order to manage
trust levels, we can use an existing decentralized trust model
such as [19], [7]. When a user v is assessed as distrustful or
suspicious, his local trust level is recomputed by a user u.
In general, a total trust level of a user could be aggregated
from log-based trust, reputation and recommendation trust. A
trust computation to get the total trust level varies from trust
models. The details of our trust model are not presented in this
paper. More details about the log auditing and trust assessment
mechanisms can be found in [22].
In order to illustrate the trust assessment mechanism, let turn
back to our previous example. In the example we presented
in Fig. 1 at the beginning of the scenario user C is trustful
for user B, having the associated trust level equal with 0.3.
During the illustrated scenario we have seen that as a result
of a log-auditing mechanism user B discovers that user C did
not respect some received contracts. User B therefore classifies
user C as distrustful and decrements his trust level to 0.1. We
can see that user B stops afterward the collaboration with user
C because of his low trust level.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section we present the evaluation of our proposed
model by performing some experiments using a peer-to-peer
simulator and we discuss some potential limitations.
A. Experiments
We evaluate the feasibility of the proposed model through
simulation using PeerSim [13] simulator. We focus first on
the ability of detecting misbehaving users; then we estimate
the overhead generated by using contracts. We setup the
simulation with a network of 200 users where some of them
are defined as misbehaving users. Due to the unavailability
of real data traces of collaboration including contracts, we
generate randomly the data flow of collaboration during the
simulation, i.e operations, contracts and users with whom to
share. One interaction is defined as the process of sharing
a log with the specified contracts, from one user to another
one. Since the total number of interactions generated must be
pseudo uniformly distributed over all users, we let one user
perform sharing with no more than 3 other users at each step.
Similarly, the number of operations and contracts generated by
one user each time is at most 10 operations and 3 contracts (if
we consider only 3 types of actions in our system: insertion,
deletion and sharing).
1) Experiment 1 - Misbehavior detection: To evaluate the
ability of misbehavior detection, we check first the ability
to detect a selected misbehaving user according to the total
number of interactions performed by all users. The estimation
is performed on the collaborative network with 60 misbehav-
ing users (30% of users are misbehaving users). The auditing
process is performed after each synchronization with another
user. We select randomly one misbehaving user to be audited
and we analyse the percentage of users that can detect him.
Fig. 3 shows the results collected after each cycle. We can
see that the misbehaving user is detected by a few users at
the beginning and then the number of users that detect his
misbehaviour increases with the number of interactions.
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Fig. 3. Ability to detect one selected misbehaving user with respect
to the total number of interactions in the collaborative network.
Second, we check the percentage of misbehaving users that
can be detected. We select randomly one honest user from the
network to observe the percentage of misbehaving users he
can detect. Fig. 4 shows the result according to the number
of synchronizations done by the selected user with others. We
can see from the graph, that up to 20% of misbehaving users
are detected after the first four synchronizations (audit done
four times), and after the fifth synchronization more than 80%
of misbehaving users are detected. We can see a drastic change
in the figure between the fourth and the fifth synchronization.
That change is due to a synchronization of the selected
user with a remote log that contains misbehaviors of most
remaining misbehaving users. This can occur in distributed
networks of random topology where clusters of collaborating
users exist. Once an interaction occurs between two users
belonging to such clusters, misbehaving users of the two
clusters are discovered. Only about 10% of misbehaving users
may require more interactions to be detected. From the results
of Fig. 4 we can see that the ability to detect misbehaving users
depends also on the topology of collaborative networks. In the
future work we will perform more experiments to evaluate how
topology would affect the detection.
In order to have a global view about the evolution of the
percentage of detected misbehaving users, we compute the
average value of detected misbehaving users over all users
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Fig. 4. Percentage of detected misbehaving users with respect to the
number of synchronizations done by the selected honest user.
of the collaborative network. Fig. 5 shows, on average, the
percentage of misbehaving users that are detected by one user.
We perform the experiment in case of a low, medium and high
population of misbehaving users in the network (respectively
5%, 30%, 80% of misbehaving users). The results show that
the system still functions well in case of a high/low population
of misbehaving users.
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2) Experiment 2 - Overhead estimation: In this experiment
we evaluate the time overhead generated by using contracts
for the synchronization and auditing mechanisms. We compare
two models: with and without contracts. To be able to make
the comparison between these two models, we follow the same
data flow. In the model without contracts, the synchroniza-
tion mechanism requires merging logs of operations. In the
model with contracts the synchronization mechanism requires
merging logs of operations and contracts. Additionally, an
auditing mechanism for detection of user misbehaviour has
to be applied.
We compute for each model the total time (T) of all the
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Fig. 6. Synchronization time with growing of number of operations
synchronizations performed by a given user to build the same
state of document, i.e. T =
∑
ti, where ti is the time required
for the ith synchronization. Fig. 6 shows the result according
to the number of write operations in the local log. From the
obtained results we can see that the time overhead generated
by using contracts is reasonable since the difference between
the times computed for the two models increases slowly with
the number of operations.
B. Limitations
Our work has some potential limitations. First, contract-
based collaboration does not offer a solution for plagiarism
and violation of contracts outside of the system. Beyond write,
share operations and contracts that a computer system could
log, there are always side channels that can work around the
logging. For example, a malicious user could replay write
operations from the log to create a new document and then
share it and claim himself as being the owner. Or a malicious
user could reveal the content of the document outside of
the system by using communication means such as email,
telephone call and chat, these actions being not logged by
the system. These violations can be detected by humans or by
using plagiarism techniques, however, this is out of the scope
of this paper. The proposed model uses contracts as a means
to express data usage restrictions that helps to protect data
privacy and to build a trustworthy collaborative environment.
A second limitation of our approach is how to deal with the
growing size of the log during collaborative process. The log
should be ultimately truncated. That requires some additional
constraints and consensus of collaborators. At the moment we
do not consider log truncation in the proposed model. Third,
we have not fully explored a wide range of contracts that
can be specified in our editing model. Currently, contracts
are based on a basic deontic logic including permission,
forbiddance, obligation and omission. They can be combined
with operators from temporal logic to express time dimension
of contracts, however, we will consider this in our further
work.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Distributed version control systems adopt the push-pull-
clone model of collaboration, but users are uniformly trusted
and there are no contracts specified during collaboration.
Wikipedia features an informal contract-based model where
contracts are checked by crowd sourcing. Anybody can edit
according to rules that are checked a-posteriori by other
people. In contract-based models rules have to be explicitly
expressed and checked by the system. Contract-based models
such as hippocratic databases [1] were mainly applied for
centralized systems where contracts can be verified by a
central authority. In our approach we applied a contract-based
model for a PPC collaboration where there is no central log
that can be audited.
Access control mechanisms ensure to give access only to
authorized users and this checking is performed before ac-
cess is allowed. Our contract-based collaboration model gives
access first to data without control but with restrictions that
are verified a-posteriori. Our C-PCC editing model is closely
related to the approach proposed in [24] in terms of ensuring
security and privacy in a weakly consistent replication system
where users are not uniformly trusted. In [24], access control
policy claims are treated as data items. The guards added to
replication protocol enforce specified policies at the synchroni-
sation step. A replica must check whether the requested action
is allowed by the policy and then decide whether to accept or
deny updates. In this approach each replica is a local authority
that maintains current policies. This is similar to our approach
where we let each user perform self-auditing based on local
view of other users actions. However, the approach described
in [24] only expresses rights but not obligations that each
replica should follow. Moreover, only the author of an item can
define the policy associated to it and hence there is no need to
resolve conflicts between policies. In our approach we need to
deal with policy conflicts as multiple contributors can specify
different contracts on the shared document. Moreover, the
system uses a state-based replication where each site applies
updates to its replica without maintaining a change log rather
than an operation-based replication as in our work.
Trust management is an important aspect of the solution that
we proposed. The concept of trust in different communities
varies according to how it is computed and used. Our work
relies on the concept of trust which is based on past user
behaviors [14]. With our C-PPC model users first bring social
trust into the system. However trust is not immutable and it
changes over time. Thus trust should be managed by using
a trust model. Various trust models for decentralized systems
exist such as NICE model [19], EigenTrust model [7]. A trust
model includes three basic components [11]: gathering behav-
ioral information, scoring and ranking peers and rewarding or
punishing peers. Most of existing P2P trust models propose
mechanisms to update trust values based on direct interactions
between peers while we use log auditing to help one user
evaluate others either through direct or indirect interactions.
Our mechanism for discovering misbehaving users can be
coupled with any existing trust model in order to manage user
trust values.
Keeping and managing event logs is frequently used for
ensuring security and privacy. This approach has been studied
in many works. In [2], a log auditing approach is used for de-
tecting misbehavior in collaborative work environments, where
a small group of users share a large number of documents
and policies. In [8], [18], authors present a logical policy-
centric framework for behaviour-based decision making. The
framework consists of a formal model of past behaviors of
principals which is based on event structures. However, the
models presented in [2], [8], [18] require a central authority
that has the ability to observe all actions of all users. This
assumption is not valid for a purely distributed PPC collabora-
tion. The complexity of our log-auditing mechanism compared
to centralized solutions comes from the fact that each user
has only a partial overview of the global collaboration and
can audit only users with whom he collaborates. Therefore, a
user can take decisions only from the information he possesses
from the users with whom he collaborates.
IX. CONCLUSION
We presented a contract extended push-pull-clone model (C-
PPC) where users share their private data by specifying some
contracts that receivers should follow. Trust values are adapted
according to users’ past behavior regarding conformance to
received contracts. Modifications done by users on the shared
data and the contracts given when data is shared are logged in a
distributed manner. A mechanism of distributed log-auditing is
applied during collaboration and users that did not conform to
the required contracts are detected and therefore their trust lev-
els are updated. We implemented the proposed collaboration
model with a number of simulations using PeerSim simulator.
Experiment results show the feasibility of our model. In future
work, we plan to analyse solutions for truncation of logs, and
to explore a wider range of contracts that can be specified in
our proposed model.
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